Annan's Syria Action Group a Hopeful Sign

Policy Alert

Andrew J. Tabler

June 27, 2012



UN special envoy Kofi Annan recently issued invitations for a June 30 meeting in Geneva to deal with the Syria crisis. The participants -- whom Annan dubbed an "action group" -- include the five permanent members of the Security Council, Turkey, and Arab League members Iraq, Kuwait, and Qatar.

Annan's invitation came after a week of talks in Geneva between his staff, Russia, and the United States regarding the formation of a more permanent "Contact Group" on Syria. Moscow and Washington continue to disagree on the nature and makeup of that group. Washington insists, quite rightly, that any Contact Group should be focused on the process of handing power from the Assad regime to another administration, and that only countries with an interest in this outcome should be at the table. This stipulation disqualifies Iran, Bashar al-Assad's stalwart ally and direct supporter in crushing the Syrian uprising. Yet Russia is less clear on the Contact Group's purpose and has argued for Iran's inclusion.

Given the rising death toll in Syria and the diplomatic effort Washington has invested over the past few months to gain Russian approval for UN action, participating in yet another round of "dialogue for dialogue's sake" holds little value unless it makes clear what a "Syrian-led transition" entails: namely, that Assad goes, and that he goes sooner, not later. Therefore, the Contact Group's composition will be key to determining whether it plays any role in Assad's departure.

So far, Washington has successfully lobbied Annan not to invite Iran. The Islamic Republic's three-decade alliance with Damascus gives it at least some influence over Assad, and many speculate that Tehran and its Hizballah allies see the regime's sixteen-month attempt to shoot its way out of the crisis as ultimately futile. Yet no matter how much outside observers may believe that Iran could best advance its interests by supporting a "soft landing" in Syria, Tehran's actual behavior indicates that it supports Assad's "hard landing" approach -- that is, shooting the population into submission. The Qods Force, part of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is the only non-Syrian entity listed under U.S. sanctions on Syria for good reason -- it has aided and abetted the Assad regime in tracking and killing Syrian civilians. According to an April Wall Street Journal report, Qods Force commander Qasem Soleimani traveled to Damascus and pledged more military and political support for the regime.

Iran would love to be part of a Contact Group on Syria, where it could use its influence to prolong Assad's lease on life and ensure that any successor government does not represent the country's majority Sunni population, which has openly chided Iran for supporting him. Accordingly, if the United States truly wants to facilitate his ouster, it should hold firm in opposing Iran's inclusion in any discussions on bringing about a post-Assad Syria.

Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.

Syria Shoots Down Turkish Jet: Washington's Dilemma

Policy Alert

Andrew J. Tabler

June 25, 2012

The United States must strongly support Turkey even at the cost of diplomatic cooperation with Russia.

When Syria shot down a Turkish military aircraft on Friday, it was yet another sign that the regional dimension of the uprising against the Assad regime is evolving from a struggle by proxy to open hostilities. The challenge for Washington is how best to respond to the crisis at a time when strong support for Turkey may endanger closer diplomatic cooperation with Russia.

Although details of the incident remain unclear, the heart of the matter is that a Turkish fighter briefly flew into Syrian airspace, was subsequently fired on, and crashed into the Mediterranean Sea. It was the latest in a string of incidents over the past few months between Syria and Turkey. As Turkish support for the opposition has increased, Assad's forces have committed a number of shootings across the Turkish frontier and actively backed the Kurdish PYD -- the Syrian branch of Ankara's old enemy, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

Even before the jet was downed, Ankara had been asking Washington for greater support in dealing with the threats from Syria. The U.S. response has been to insist that Turkey ask for a consultation under Article 4 of the NATO charter, which concerns threats to a member state's "territorial integrity, political independence, or security." That fateful meeting will finally happen tomorrow as a result of Friday's incident.

Washington's dilemma is simple: over the past week, it has invested considerable time and effort talking with Russian representatives in Geneva, where officials are assessing the purpose and modalities of a "Contact Group" of countries to find a political solution to the Syria crisis. On one hand, if Washington does not back Turkey sufficiently, it will signal to Bashar al-Assad that downing NATO aircraft will not cost him militarily. On the other hand, if the United States expresses unqualified public support for Turkey, and if NATO announces or even hints that it is preparing various contingencies for Syria (a 180-degree shift from its latest summit in Chicago), then Russian support for the proposed Contact Group could be in jeopardy.

Of course, Turkey itself may have multiple interests at stake in the NATO consultation. Ankara likely views the meeting as a test of its relationship with Washington and key NATO partners as much as a call for allied support against Damascus. Ankara does not appear to be chomping at the bit for confrontation with Syria, but Turkish leaders would surely like to know whether the alliance is ready to back it should such conflict ensue. Based on today's comments by EU leaders, NATO support is qualified at best.

Solving this dilemma requires that Washington get its priorities straight. U.S. policy clearly states that the solution to the crisis is in line with that of the vast majority of Syrians -- Assad has to go. Although avoiding full-blown civil war should be a consideration in how Washington pursues his departure, it is not a goal in of itself. Forcing his ouster via diplomacy alone is a long shot at best, even with Moscow's help. To increase the chances of diplomatic success while preparing for the steady worsening of the conflict (a well-established trend since the uprising began), Washington should openly state its options for "Plan B" during the NATO meeting, and its willingness to exercise them.
Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.

Confronting Damascus: U.S. Policy toward the Evolving Situation in Syria, Part II

Featuring Andrew J. Tabler
April 25, 2012


Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia
 
Chairman Chabot and Ranking Member Ackerman:

Thank you for this opportunity to testify before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia on the situation in Syria and U.S. government efforts to force President Bashar al-Assad to "step aside," as outlined by President Obama in August 2011.

During Part I of this hearing in December 2011, a representative of the Obama administration characterized Assad as a "dead man walking." I agreed with that assessment at the time, and I think much of it still holds true: international pressure and sanctions placed upon the Assad regime are having an unprecedented effect on its ability to fund its operations, and evidence shows that hard currency reserves are being rapidly depleted. Unfortunately, however, repeated vetoes by Russia and China of United Nations Security Council action, the overall lack of "defections" from the core of the Assad regime, and the findings of a recent visit I made to southern Turkey and Lebanon have all helped me understand that Assad still has many more political and military resources that he can call upon to continue what is literally a "death march" for months if not years to come. To force Assad to "step aside," the United States will need to accelerate efforts from the ground up by supporting the opposition "within Syria" in concert with allies forming the "core" of the Friends of the Syrian People group of countries.

TREATING THE SYMPTOMS BUT NOT THE DISEASE OF THE SYRIA CRISIS
The Assad regime's continued suppression of the Syrian opposition continues, and has claimed upwards of 10,000 lives thus far. Thousands more have been arrested or displaced, including those that have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Recently, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution backing a six-point plan developed by special envoy Kofi Annan intended to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a process to facilitate a "Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system." Despite agreeing to the plan, the Assad regime has failed to meet agreed deadlines to cease use of live fire and heavy weapons, as well as its commitments to withdraw its forces from population centers. The UN has also approved a plan to place up to 300 monitors in Syria for up to three months to observe implementation of the plan. Given the regime's failure to observe the agreement thus far, it is unclear if the monitors will be able to do their jobs. What the regime's failure to implement the agreement thus far shows, however, is that what has become known as the "Annan plan" may be able to deal with some of the symptoms of the crisis in Syria, including introduction of monitors and delivery of humanitarian assistance, but it has little hope of dealing with the disease itself -- a minority-dominated regime with a forty-two-year track record of being unable to reform, and now brutally suppressing an opposition carved out of one of the youngest populations in the Middle East.

The UN monitors who arrived in Damascus recently have observed protestors brave enough to endure a military lockdown that is severely limiting the people's ability to use civil resistance to make Assad "step aside" -- the stated goal of President Obama. The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance. Assad's actions thus far indicate that he wants to use the Annan plan to grind down not only the armed opposition, but the overall protest movement as a whole. Thus the Annan plan, as currently implemented, serves Assad's interests and directly undermines those of the United States.

The introduction of monitors is a positive development, but only insofar as it will help guarantee Syrians' right to peacefully express themselves in favor of the Assad regime stepping aside. Quite simply, the regime is failing to implement point two of the Annan plan -- halting fighting and use of heavy weapons and withdrawing its forces from population centers -- because it knows it cannot implement point six of the plan: "respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed." Assad knows well that peaceful protestors, who have continued their activities unabated as the international community has focused its attention on the armed opposition, will fill Syria's main squares and demand his departure or worse. To preclude this scenario, he has labeled peaceful protestors as "terrorists" and used live fire to put them down.

Diplomacy will continue to play an important role as the crisis unfolds. In the end, Russia and China may be important as part of any effort to get Assad to step aside and usher in a Syrian government more responsive to the demands of its youthful population. But Assad's dodging of the Annan plan's deadline, as well as his attempt via Russia to blur the main tenets of the agreement by introducing monitors before a ceasefire, amply demonstrate the limits of diplomacy at this time.

But perhaps most important, the regime's failure to seriously implement the plan calls into question whether any viable political solution can emerge from Annan's stated goal of "comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the spectrum of the opposition." In the end, whatever solution emerges will of course be uniquely Syrian. But what will it look like? A "reform" of the political system similar to Lebanon's, where various posts and bodies are essentially allotted to different sects, with Alawites and other minorities gathered around the presidency and the parliament going to the majority Sunni population? The Lebanese system was formed over time and in many ways is dysfunctional. A "managed transition" similar to Yemen -- a goal of the Obama administration -- may be preferable. But Assad seems unlikely to negotiate his own exit, especially as Russia and China have forbidden language in Security Council resolutions outlining what the end goal of the process would be.

PLAN B: A GROUND-UP STRATEGY
The best way the United States has of ensuring that President Assad steps aside and expediting a more democratic government in Syria is to implement "Plan B" -- a coordinated effort to pressure the regime from the ground up, including support for the opposition "within Syria." This effort is already partially underway and would be implemented in addition to sanctions and other diplomatic pressure.
The United States is a member of the Friends of the Syrian People, a collection of eighty-three countries that met for the second time on April 1 in Istanbul to support the people and prepare for a post-Assad Syria. Washington would be well placed to work with the group's other core members -- which include Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar -- to forge and lead a coalition of countries to more directly support the opposition within Syria and prepare for all contingencies concerning the crisis. Different countries would play different roles within this coalition. Gulf countries, for example, have already indicated a willingness to help arm the opposition within Syria. Turkey, which had to deal recently with live fire from Assad's forces in the Oncupinar Syrian refugee camp near Kilis, is now considering methods to funnel support to the opposition and has reportedly developed a contingency plan to create border safe havens for refugees within Syrian territory. Thus far, the United States has officially committed to giving nonlethal assistance to the opposition within Syria, which could include communications equipment.

Pressuring Assad to end violence against the population and, ultimately, make an exit will require more such U.S. assistance. In the short term, the United States should share limited intelligence with the opposition inside Syria concerning the deployment and movement of regime forces -- security, military, and paramilitary shabbiha -- especially as they approach population centers for an assault. This will help alleviate the effects of Assad's "whack-a-mole" approach to the opposition, in which regime forces attempt to clear areas -- a tactic that drives up death tolls and refugee flows -- but cannot hold them.

Second, the United States should intensify its examination of the opposition within Syria, both those entities practicing nonviolent resistance against the regime and those engaged in violent revolt. Such assessment should include ways to support popular self-defense alongside civil resistance as two sides of the opposition coin. A key first step would be to intensify the process of identifying and engaging groups that share not only Washington's short-term goal of ousting Assad, but also its long-term goals, including a democratic and secular post-Assad Syria whose government respects human and minority rights.

Third, Washington should immediately expand contingency planning about possible direct U.S. military support as part of actions to head off massacres or a humanitarian disaster. This includes supporting the creation, with allies such as Turkey, of safe havens inside Syria. In addition, the United States should consider what kind of military force may be required, and under what circumstances, to assist the Syrian opposition in deposing the Assad regime.

DILEMMAS POSED BY CIVIL AND ARMED RESISTANCE WILL ACCELERATE ASSAD'S DEPARTURE
Washington should continue to press for UN Security Council resolutions or statements condemning Assad. But to base its approach on the likelihood of international consensus on a workable and sustainable solution to the crisis would be unwise at this time.

The best means of whittling away the regime's support base continues to be exposing Assad's brutal response to dilemmas posed by the civil and armed opposition inside Syria. What is going on in Syria is not a civil war, but an armed and unarmed insurrection against a regime that responded with extreme brutality to peaceful protest. The opposition in exile organized under the Syrian National Council may be rife with divisions, but as the conflict has morphed into a civil and armed insurgency against the regime, coordination among atomized opposition groups inside Syria has intensified for reasons of sheer survival. The United States needs to find ways to promote, assist, and influence that trend. Such trials by fire, which now are an inevitable part of the uprising, will likely serve as the forge in which a viable post-Assad Syrian political system is formed. Greater U.S. involvement would increase the chances that the new Syria is much more democratic and closer to American interests than Bashar al-Assad's regime.

Andrew J. Tabler is a Next Generation fellow in The Washington Institute's Program on Arab Politics.

Assad Must Be Forced to Allow Peaceful Assembly

By Andrew J. Tabler
Policy Alert, April 18, 2012

Videos and reports from Syria over the past week show that Bashar al-Assad's forces continue to violate the ceasefire outlined by UN special representative Kofi Annan on April 12. The regime has neither ended its use of heavy weapons in population centers nor -- an additional obligation -- pulled back its military. This suppression of dissent in centers of resistance has obviously constrained the people's right to freedom of peaceful expression and assembly, a key tenet of U.S. policy that is clearly outlined in point six of the Annan plan. As a result, Syrians are afraid to express their demands as part of the "Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, pluralist system" and have demonstrated in lesser numbers than expected over the past week. Even if a viable ceasefire can eventually be brokered, protests and other forms of civil resistance will be the key means to judge what the people want going forward. It seems certain that the UN monitors who have arrived in Damascus over the past few days will be observing only those protestors brave enough to endure a military lockdown that is severely limiting the people's ability to use civil resistance to make Assad "step aside" -- the stated goal of President Obama. The regime has had a far harder time dealing with civil resistance over the past year than armed resistance. Assad's actions thus far indicate that he wants to use the Annan plan to grind down not only the armed opposition, but the overall protest movement as a whole.
The introduction of monitors is a positive development, but only insofar as it will help guarantee Syrians' right to peacefully express themselves in favor of the Assad regime stepping aside. Failure now to ensure that point six of the Annan plan is carried out will only strengthen the regime's hand against the opposition and ensure that the agreement addresses neither the symptoms nor the disease in the Syrian conflict -- a minority regime's brutal suppression of the youngest population in the Middle East outside the Palestinian territories.
To boost the Annan plan's effectiveness, the United States should immediately release daily satellite photography outlining the regime's violations and noncompliance with demands to stop using heavy weapons and to begin redeploying its forces, as it did on April 6 ahead of the previous April 10 redeployment deadline. Next, given the scale of continued regime operations in Syria, the distribution of protests, and the country's geographic size, the United States should demand a sharp increase in the number of proposed monitors, currently slated for 250. (In comparison, 2,000 observers were deployed in 1998 to Kosovo, which is barely a tenth the size of Syria.) Given the divisive nature of the Syrian crisis in international politics, monitors should be selected from a wide spectrum of countries, not the array of "neutral countries" of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa outlined by Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem earlier today. Monitors should be empowered to go where they see fit and given self-protection, secure means of communication, intelligence from the United States, and other services to assist the planning of operations and rapid response to unfolding violence. In addition, the protocol worked out between the UN and the Syrian regime must allow for full range of motion and access to all sites.
Last but not least, it is time to activate Plan B. The regime's limited implementation of the Annan plan to date indicates that there is little hope of convincing Assad to honor the agreement's other tenets, including engaging in an "inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people," the "timely provision of humanitarian assistance," "release of arbitrarily detained persons," and ensuring "freedom of movement throughout the country" and a "non-discriminatory visa policy" for journalists. Therefore, the United States should explore ways to manage the Annan plan's breakdown and expand the agenda of tomorrow's "Friends of the Syrian People" ministerial meeting in Paris to include ways of better coordinating the activities of the alliance's "core group" -- i.e., the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
A major motivation for Syria's noncompliance and Moscow's willingness to provide cover for it -- as witnessed by Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov's April 17 criticism of the Friends meeting -- is both countries' desire to leverage compliance with the Annan plan against the formation of an effective coalition to deal with the crisis. This includes Assad's demands that Annan obtain written guarantees that the opposition will lay down its weapons, and also commitments regarding Qatar and Saudi Arabia's support of the opposition. Therefore, the best way to reverse the regime's violence and piecemeal implementation of the Annan plan -- hardly a good start for "dialogue" intended to produce a "Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political system" -- is to accelerate the work of the Friends "core group." In the face of continuing evasion by the regime, the United States and others should begin concerted planning for more forceful measures, including military assistance to elements of the armed opposition and contingency preparations for armed intervention.
Andrew J. Tabler is the Next Generation fellow at The Washington Institute and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria.

After the Annan Deadline: Options for U.S. Policy on Syria

PolicyWatch #1923
By Andrew J. Tabler
April 11, 2012

Washington would be well advised to expand its support for the opposition "within Syria" through a coalition from the Group of Friends of the Syrian People.

Bashar al-Assad's complete disregard for UN special envoy Kofi Annan's April 10 deadline for withdrawal of regime forces from population centers is only the latest sign that Damascus has no intention of implementing the envoy's six-point plan to deal with the Syria crisis. The fact that the regime's armed forces will remain in and around population centers when a proposed ceasefire takes effect at dawn on April 12 means that peaceful self-expression and assembly -- core tenets of U.S. policy in Syria for the past year -- will be effectively impossible. Combined with the regime's other demands beyond the scope of the Annan deal, it now seems that while the UN initiative may at best temporarily reduce some humanitarian suffering, it is unlikely to be able to provide a political solution that would end the crisis. Therefore, the United States would be well advised to expand its support for the opposition "within Syria" through a coalition of the core members of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People that met in Istanbul last week.

Noncompliance with the Annan Plan
Despite Syrian foreign minister Walid Mouallem's assurances in Moscow that the Assad regime is implementing Annan's six-point plan, developments on the ground suggest the opposite. The Assad regime pledged in point two of the plan to "immediately cease troop movements towards, and end the use of heavy weapons in, population centers, and begin a pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers." In the past week alone, the regime has intensified its shelling of villages and neighborhoods throughout Syria, killing more than 1000 people according to opposition sources. On April 6, the U.S. Department of State released satellite imagery showing that military forces have not been withdrawn from populations centers, as outlined under the Annan plan, but rather only repositioned near population centers. On April 11, Local Coordination Committees in Syria reported shelling, troop movements into towns, and more than 100 casualties. Damascus has exploited the UN plan to again attempt to impose its "security solution" over the country, squeeze out space for peaceful protest, and dictate terms from above. Given that protests and armed resistance actions continue, Damascus has failed yet again.
The signs of Damascus's noncompliance with the plan have been readily apparent. On April 5, Syria's representative to the UN, Bashar Jaafari, said that the agreement to withdraw military formations did not include "police forces" -- a vague reference to the regime's security forces, which have been major participants in the crackdown. Then on April 8, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Jamal Makdessi announced that it was a "wrong interpretation" to expect that Damascus would abide by its pledge to Annan to withdraw its military forces by April 10. He went on to make further demands outside the UN agreement, including that Annan obtain "written guarantees" from the opposition to halt violence, as well as from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey to stop "funding and arming terrorist groups" -- the Assad regime's parlance for the Syrian opposition as a whole.
More important, the Assad regime is failing to implement point two of the Annan plan -- withdrawal of forces from population centers -- because it knows it cannot implement point six of the plan: "respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully as legally guaranteed." Assad knows well that peaceful protestors, who have continued their activities unabated as the international community has focused its attention on the armed opposition, will fill Syria's main squares and demand Assad's departure or worse. To preclude this scenario, Assad has labeled peaceful protestors as "terrorists" and used live fire to put them down. The only aspect of the Annan plan that may be immediately workable would be temporary cessation of hostilities to provide humanitarian aid, along with admission of journalists and UN monitors.

Working the Problem from the Ground Up 
Diplomacy will continue to play an important role as the Syria crisis unfolds. In the end, Russia and China may be important as part of any effort to get Assad to step aside and usher in a Syrian government more responsible to the demands of Syria's youthful population. But Assad's dodging of the Annan plan's deadline, as well as his attempt via Russia to blur the main tenets of the agreement by introducing monitors before a ceasefire, amply demonstrates the limits of diplomacy at this time.
Fortunately, the United States has options. The United States is a member of the Group of Friends of the Syrian People, a collection of eighty-three countries that met for the second time on April 1 in Istanbul to support the Syrian people and prepare for a post-Assad Syria. Washington would be well placed to work with the group's other core members, which include Britain, France, Germany, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, to forge and lead a coalition of countries to more directly support the Syrian opposition within Syria and prepare for all contingencies concerning the Syria crisis. Different countries would play different roles within this coalition. Gulf countries, for example, have already indicated a willingness to help arm the opposition within Syria. Turkey, which had to deal with deadly fire from Syrian forces in the Oncupinar Syrian refugee camp near Kilis this week, is now considering methods to funnel support to the opposition and has reportedly developed a contingency plan to develop border safe havens for refugees within Syrian territory. Thus far, the United States has officially committed to giving nonlethal assistance to the opposition within Syria, which could include communications equipment.
To pressure Assad to end violence against the population and ultimately make an exit will require more U.S. assistance for the opposition within Syria. In the short term, the United States should share limited intelligence with the opposition concerning the deployment and movement of Assad regime forces -- security, military, and paramilitary Shabiha -- within Syria, especially as they approach population centers for an assault. This will help alleviate the effects of Assad's "whack-a-mole" approach to the opposition, in which regime forces attempt to clear areas -- a tactic that drives up death tolls and refugee flows -- but cannot hold them.
Second, the United States should intensify its examination of the opposition within Syria, both those entities practicing violent and nonviolent resistance against the regime. Such study should include ways to support popular self-defense alongside civil resistance, as two sides of the opposition coin. A key first step would be to intensify the process of identifying groups with which Washington could work that not only share Washington's short-term goal of ousting Assad but its long-term goals as well, including a secular post-Assad Syria whose government respects minority rights.
Third, Washington should immediately expand contingency planning about possible direct U.S. military support as part of actions to head off massacres or a humanitarian disaster in the country. This includes supporting the creation, with allies such as Turkey, of safe havens inside Syria.

Conclusion
The Annan plan's failure demonstrates that the UN process going forward may be able to treat the symptoms of the disease -- the humanitarian fallout from the crisis -- but is unlikely to cure the disease itself -- the minority Assad regime's brutal rule over a majority Sunni population that is the youngest in the Middle East outside the Palestinian territories. Washington should continue to press for UN Security Council resolutions or statements condemning Assad, but to base its approach on the likelihood of international consensus on the Syria crisis would be unwise.
The best means of whittling away at the Assad regime's support base continues to be exposing the regime's brutal response to dilemmas posed by the civil and armed opposition inside Syria. What is going on in Syria is not a civil war but an armed and unarmed insurrection against a regime that responded with extreme brutality to peaceful protest. The Syrian opposition in exile organized under the Syrian National Council may be rife with divisions. But as the conflict in Syria has morphed into a civil and armed insurgency against the regime, coordination among atomized opposition groups inside Syria has intensified for reasons of sheer survival. The United States needs to find ways to promote, assist, and influence that trend.
Andrew J. Tabler is Next Generation Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and author, most recently, of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria.