Syria's Meltdown Requires a U.S.-Led Response

PolicyWatch 2054

Andrew J. Tabler

Also available in العربية

March 22, 2013

As Syria heads toward a meltdown spilling over its borders -- with loss of control over strategic weapons, accelerated refugee flows, spreading extremism, and Sunni-Shiite clashes -- only engaging with those doing the fighting will give Washington much influence over events.

Two years after it began as a protest movement, the Syrian uprising has long since turned into a full-blown armed insurrection, with Sunni Arab rebel battalions fighting the Alawite regime while Kurdish factions show mixed hostility to both. Given the lack of a visible political solution, the reported use of chemical agents, the increasing spillover to and from neighboring countries, and the growing belief that Syria may already be a failed state, Washington must take a leading role in decisively dealing with the disease -- namely, the Assad regime's brutal assault on its citizens -- not just the humanitarian symptoms.

SYRIA'S MELTDOWN

The news from Syria is grimmer than ever, with over 70,000 people killed and over 130,000 either missing or held prisoner. The core of the conflict remains internal: Bashar al-Assad's attempt to shoot, bomb, missile, and perhaps even gas the population into submission. Unlike the 1979-1982 uprising, however, Syria's demographics are now much more skewed against the regime: in the ten years following the February 1982 Hama massacre, Syrians largely stayed home and procreated, making them one of the twenty fastest-growing populations on earth. Those born during that period constitute the majority of the forces currently fighting the regime.
Moreover, in the absence of major Western support, Salafist and other Islamist extremists from the Persian Gulf, North Africa, and neighboring countries have come to the opposition's aid, causing more Syrians to side with their cause. As a result, the rebels have only been able to grind down the regime, not eliminate it, in a war that is increasingly eating down into the sectarian nature of Syrian society, destroying the country, and creating a haven for Sunni and Shiite terrorist groups, perhaps for years to come. No political solution is in sight, especially given U.S. and Russian differences over what "transition" means. Even if Moscow and Washington did agree on how to pursue such a solution, Russia could not deliver the regime, nor could the United States deliver the entire opposition. In short, there seems nothing to prevent Syria's complete meltdown in the coming months.

SPILLING OUT, SPILLING IN

One of the reasons why containing the conflict may no longer be possible is because its effects are increasingly spilling over Syria's borders in both directions. The most worrisome effects include the following:
Strategic weapons transfer and loss of control. The Assad regime holds arguably the region's largest stockpile of chemical weapons, some of which it may have used this week. These and other strategic weapons (e.g., Scuds and other surface-to-surface missiles) are scattered around scores of sites, and the regime is desperate to keep them out of the hands of its adversaries. This has raised concerns that Assad may be tempted to transfer advanced weapons to his Hezbollah allies in Lebanon; in fact, Israel attacked a regime convoy near Damascus last month for reportedly attempting just such a transfer.
Given recent territorial losses, however, the regime might lose control of its stockpiles before it is able to move or destroy them. In that scenario, extremists could obtain untold numbers of chemical or other strategic weapons, whether for use against regime forces, transfer to militants in the Golan Heights, or transfer to neighboring states for use in global jihad operations.
Refugee crisis. The UN has registered over 1.1 million refugees in the countries bordering Syria, but that figure only begins to tell the story. Individual estimates from each country are much higher, and the millions of displaced persons languishing without aid inside Syria may soon cross the border if more regime forces pull back to defend Damascus. In the Houran region, for example, the average rate of refugees crossing the border is already around 3,000 per day, and the only thing keeping that number from increasing is the presence of regular and irregular regime patrols that fire on those attempting to pass.
Meanwhile, Jordanian border forces have returned fire on occasion, leading to a few deaths. If Assad's forces pull back further, aid agencies estimate that some 15,000-20,000 refugees per day could flow into the kingdom. Even at the current rate, Jordan will have some 770,000 Syrian refugees by June.
Spreading extremism. In addition to humanitarian issues, the refugees are bringing with them the various political problems currently enflaming Syrian communities, most notably the rise of extremist ideologies from the Gulf and North Africa. This could destabilize areas with large numbers of refugees, particularly northern Jordan, Turkey's Hatay and Kilis provinces, and portions of Lebanon. To endanger the region's security architecture, especially around Israel, extremist groups only need certain areas of a state to fail, not the entire country. Such areas could then be used as staging grounds for attacks against Israel, and as havens for operations inside Syria, whether before or after Assad falls.
Cross-border Sunni-Shiite fighting. In Lebanon's north Beqa region, Shiite Hezbollah militants are openly operating across the border against Syrian Sunni groups fighting the Assad regime south of al-Qusayr. This includes targeting rebel positions with rocket fire from Lebanon. Yet residents of the nearby Lebanese Sunni village of Arsal are helping the Syrian rebels repel these Hezbollah operations, causing considerable tension at home; for example, at least two Lebanese army soldiers were recently murdered after fellow troops killed Free Syrian Army supporter Khaled Hmayed.
At stake in such clashes is control of the mixed Sunni-Shiite area lying west and south of the Syrian city of Homs, which a rump Assad statelet would need to be contiguous with Lebanon's Hezbollah-controlled Beqa Valley. The fighting has exacerbated existing tensions caused by daily Syrian regime shelling of Lebanese border areas along the Nahr al-Kibar river valley, resulting in considerable sectarian strife from Wadi Khaled westward toward the Akkar district and Tripoli. Such activities could set off full-scale Sunni-Shiite conflict in Lebanon and draw in each side's regional patrons.

WORKING FROM THE GROUND UP

This week's reports of possible chemical weapons use in Syria imply that direct military intervention against the Assad regime is now in the mix. Yet even that measure alone will not change the country's overall trajectory toward disintegration. The best way for the United States to avert a meltdown and, ultimately, contain the crisis is to lead a coalition to end the Assad regime from the ground up, not simply deal with the symptoms of the conflict. Assad has not "stepped aside," and a "peaceful, democratic, and secular" Syria is not going to evolve anytime soon. Syria is now more violent than Iraq, where the United States had thousand of troops and assets to help shape the outcome. Simply engaging the opposition coalition in exile and relying on Qatar or Saudi Arabia to arm the rebels via the Supreme Military Council is insufficient.
Syrians, like all people, cannot follow what they do not understand; therefore, it will take a lot more than U.S. intelligence vetting of armed groups to shape a post-Assad outcome that aligns with U.S. interests. The best way for Washington to influence the composition and mindset of the armed rebels is to directly engage with vetted units fighting on the ground. This includes encouraging their integration into either the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) or a successor organization that can boast greater representation of groups inside the country.
Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria.

Implications of Possible Chemical Weapons Use in Syria

PolicyWatch 2051

Michael Herzog, Michael Knights, Andrew J. Tabler, and Jeffrey White

Also available in العربية

March 21, 2013

The Syrian regime has good reasons to both use chemical weapons and disguise what it has done. Having pegged out a firm stance on such weapons, Washington should respond vigorously with defensive measures while the investigation of reported use proceeds.

Claims that chemical weapons (CW) were used in Syria Tuesday center on two reported incidents. The first, claimed by the regime, was at Khan al-Asal in the northern Aleppo province; at least 25 people died (reportedly including 16 regime troops), and more than 110 were injured. The regime claims a rocket or missile with a chemical agent hit a government-controlled area. The second incident, claimed by the opposition, was in the town of Ataibah east of Damascus; it included "fierce shelling with chemical rockets" containing an agent that induced "suffocating and nausea cases" as well as "headache, vomiting, and hysteria cases." The two episodes occurred hundreds of miles apart.
According to Syrian information minister Omran al-Zoubi, the missile or rocket that struck Khan al-Asal came from Qatar or another Arab League country, a claim that may be possible to verify or refute through intelligence sources. He stated that those responsible "must be held accountable -- a king or a prince, a president or a minister." The Syrian regime has asked the UN to investigate. For their part, the military office of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) and other groups denied that they have the ability to deploy such weapons and instead blamed the regime, claiming it missed its original target of a police academy taken by the rebels.
Resolving the uncertainty about these incidents could take some time, but simple logic can shed some light in the meantime. First, the rebels are not known to have any CW capability. Second, it seems highly unlikely that they would use CW against a town (Ataibah) that they controlled in one of the centers of resistance in the Damascus area (East Ghouta). It also seems unlikely that the regime and the rebels would have conducted nearly simultaneous CW attacks. In short, context, capability, and motivation all point to the regime, and in this case the simplest answer is likely the best one.
These incidents are not the first alleged CW attacks in Syria. Opposition members still claim that the regime used Agent 15, a hallucinogen, against rebel forces on December 23 -- an accusation that has not been substantiated or completely rejected by the U.S. government. They also believe that the regime is now using second-tier chemical agents (i.e., weapons that are less lethal than sarin, mustard, and VX gases) to strike fear into the opposition and overall civilian population. This is in keeping with their claims that the regime has begun using artillery and surface-to-surface missiles at will.

WHAT ARE THE RULES ABOUT CW?

The March 19 episodes illustrate that CW use is not necessarily a black-or-white situation, and that skillful regime moves could exploit ambiguities. Syria is not a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, under which states pledge to refrain from use of CW. It is a signatory to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on CW, however. That document holds that the regime cannot use CW unless it is first attacked with CW, a provision that seems applicable to internal conflict as well as declared wars. Thus, if the rebels used CW first, the regime would be free under international law to respond in kind. This issue could become important if Syrian friends such as Russia insist that no UN Security Council action be taken until there is convincing evidence that the regime used CW before the rebels did.
Another complicated issue is precisely defining what constitutes a chemical weapon. UN General Assembly Resolution 2603 (XXIV) of December 16, 1969, defined chemical warfare agents as "chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals and plants." Despite that sweeping language, there are many types of weapons with a somewhat ambiguous status. Although riot-control agents such as CS gas (a.k.a. tear gas) are generally accepted as being nonlethal, some have challenged this classification and called for these agents to be recognized as CW. Incendiary-type weapons such as napalm and phosphorus are not classified as CW agents because their destructive power is primarily thermal. Smoke-producing obscurant rounds are also not viewed as CW.
Many past incidents in the Middle East have tested the boundaries of CW. For instance, al-Qaeda in Iraq has employed several truck bombs filled with chlorine, a readily available agent often used in industry (e.g., water treatment facilities). And in 1991, facing internal rebellions, the Iraqi regime used helicopters to drop sarin-filled bombs (obviously CW) to little effect. After a senior CW officer complained about the failure of the initial helicopter sorties, however, the military dropped up to 200 large aerial bombs with tear gas on rebel targets near Karbala and Najaf.

MILITARY UTILITY OF CW

Given all the risks and complications associated with the use of chemical weapons, why would the Syrian regime employ them? Part of the answer lies in the difficulties that regime forces are facing at this stage of the war. Increasingly well-armed and capable rebel forces are enjoying more success in both offensive and defensive actions. As a result, the regime has suffered recent setbacks in Raqqa, Aleppo, Deir al-Zour, Homs, Quneitra, Deraa, and Rif Damascus. It has lost positions and urban areas to advancing rebel forces and has been unable to make any significant gains of its own. Its increasing use of surface-to-surface missiles and growing reliance on irregular forces have not redressed the situation. The regime's pattern throughout the war has been to escalate its use of violence -- to go ever deeper into its arsenal in order to crush the rebellion. It is now reaching the end of what it can do, and chemical weapons are the last resort.
Chemical weapons also have tactical military utility. Assuming the units employing them are adequately trained and equipped, CW can be used defensively against rebel forces laying siege to regime installations, or offensively against rebels defending important urban areas and positions. Rebel units are currently laying siege to or assaulting a number of important installations (e.g., airfields, army depots). The regime's standard tactics and weapons have often failed to save such facilities, so using CW could help defend them. Similarly, the rebels' growing antitank capabilities have raised the toll of regime attempts to retake lost positions, so using CW to soften these targets makes sense from a military standpoint. Indeed, Tuesday's reported chemical attack on the Rif Damascus town of Ataibah may have been a case of offensive use.
Of course, chemical weapons are not a silver bullet that ensures success. Much depends on the capabilities of the troops using them. But the regime does not have good military options left -- nothing it has tried so far has worked consistently, and the rebels have only become stronger, both generally and tactically.

THE ISRAELI ANGLE

According to Israeli government sources, chemical agents were indeed used in Syria, most likely by the regime, though the type of agents employed remains unclear. Although the risks inherent in Syria's civil war were already high on the agenda of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's discussions with President Obama this week, these new reports highlighted Israel's concerns about the dangerous fallout from its crumbling neighbor.
From Israel's perspective, Bashar al-Assad's readiness to use CW and cross a U.S. redline, if confirmed, is in keeping with his previous decision to cross an Israeli redline by providing strategic weapons to Hezbollah (a move that reportedly spurred an Israeli airstrike in Syria in February). In other words, as the situation in Syria deteriorates, Assad is becoming an increasingly dangerous actor. Above all, Israel is concerned that the tumult could enable hostile elements (e.g., jihadists in Syria or Hezbollah in Lebanon) to acquire weapons from the Assad regime's huge strategic stockpile, whether chemical or conventional.
In Wednesday's joint press conference with Netanyahu following a lengthy meeting in Jerusalem, President Obama seemed to respond to these Israeli concerns and expectations by warning the Assad regime against "the use of chemical weapons or their transfer to terrorists." To Israeli ears, the latter addition implies U.S. backing should Israel feel compelled to once again halt the transfer of strategic weapons from Syria to Lebanon.

U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

The Assad regime may wish to test the firmness of U.S. redlines on CW use, and creating ambiguity about whether such weapons were used and by whom is an excellent way to do so. Employing second-tier agents or falsely claiming that the rebels are using CW could help Damascus confuse the issue and condition the international community to a growing role for CW in the war. If Washington does not respond vigorously, the regime might feel emboldened to expand its use of such weapons, including more-lethal agents.
Meanwhile, opposition members are becoming increasingly resentful of the United States for not responding to the regime's growing use of strategic weapons. They are also troubled by the stories that the White House leaked to the New York Times outlining the regime's loading of CW into bombs in or near airfields. These reports, combined with the Obama administration's refusal to arm the rebels, have led to growing resentment of Washington -- a sentiment harvested by increasingly influential extremist groups in Syria.
More broadly, one can assume that the new Israeli government will regard any chemical challenge from Syria as a test of whether Washington will deliver on firm statements. That is, if the United States will not enforce its stated redline on the Assad regime, can it be trusted to back up its commitments on Iran?
Given the strategic stakes of Tuesday's reported CW use, Washington should take the following steps:

• Determine what happened. Given the past controversy over weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, neither the international community nor the American people will uncritically accept U.S. intelligence assessments of CW use in Syria. Respected international bodies should therefore be asked to weigh in, perhaps by examining and interviewing victims to determine what agents may have been used against them. The International Committee of the Red Cross is one obvious agency to call upon, given its historical role in investigating claims of CW use by Iraq in the 1990s and Egypt in the 1960s, among others. The Assad regime's calls for an investigation provide an opportunity that should be seized -- the UN Security Council should give investigators the authority to look into whatever reports of CW use they deem worthy of checking out.

• Defend the Syrian people. NATO and the United States could deploy Patriot missile batteries in Turkey to defend northern Syria (including Idlib, Aleppo, and Raqqa) against missile attack. It could also provide Patriots with an antiaircraft capability. Such actions would fall under the rubric of defending civilian populations and could reduce the regime's ability to use missile and air forces generally, not just for CW attacks. In addition, NATO may not require proof of CW use to deploy these defensive measures. Yet this approach would not be a comprehensive answer to the CW threat either; in particular, it would not address the regime's use of field artillery.

• Prepare "consequences management." In light of Tuesday's incidents, Washington and its allies should begin preparing for the consequences of large-scale CW use, such as stockpiling defensive clothing for distribution inside Syria and beefing up the capabilities of hospitals in surrounding areas to handle victims. If the regime's strategy is to scare the Syrian people, the international response should be to reassure them.

• Plan for worst-case military options. Given the president's firm statements about the unacceptability of CW use, Washington should accelerate military planning for potential strikes against the regime's chemical arsenal. The practical problems would be many. It is highly unlikely that the United States and regional states could identify all CW locations, much less seize or secure them. Yet many such locations could be identified and, if necessary, neutralized one way or another. If the administration clearly indicated its determination to act -- alone and from the sea if necessary -- the prospect of regional cooperation would be much greater than if it simply consulted with other governments about the problem in general terms. For example, Aegis cruisers could be used to provide additional defense capabilities, which would have the merit of showing that the United States can act on its own if its partners are still debating what to do.

Furthermore, Washington could warn that if CW use is confirmed, the United States would strike both the forces involved in the attacks and Syria's military command-and-control (as distinct from the political leadership) if necessary to prevent further use. Such strikes could be conducted from the air without much difficulty. Although this approach might not directly halt additional CW attacks, it would eventually devastate the regime's entire war effort, making clear to Assad that the use of chemical weapons will bring down his regime.

Brig. Gen. Michael Herzog, IDF (Ret.), is The Washington Institute's Milton Fine international fellow and a former participant in Israel's peace negotiations with Syria. Michael Knights is a Boston-based Lafer fellow with the Institute. Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow at the Institute. Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at the Institute and a former senior defense intelligence officer.

SHOULD THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES INTERVENE MILITARILY IN SYRIA?

ANDREW TABLER
SENIOR FELLOW, PROGRAM ON ARAB
POLITICS, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY; AUTHOR, IN THE
LION’S DEN: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT
OF WASHINGTON’S BATTLE WITH SYRIA

WRITTEN FOR CQ RESEARCHER, FEBRUARY 2013

“You break it, you buy it” may have proven true for
the United States in Iraq, but great powers are
often forced to help clean up conflicts they did
not cause but that threaten their interests. If Washington continues
its “light footprint” policy of non-intervention in Syria, the
American people will likely have to foot the bill for a more expensive
cleanup of the spillover of the Syria conflict into neighboring
states and the overall battle against international terrorism.

Every indicator of the conflict between the Alawite-dominated
Assad regime and the largely Sunni opposition has taken a
dramatic turn for the worse, with upwards of 65,000 killed,
30,000 missing and up to 3 million Syrians internally displaced
during one of the worst Syrian winters in two decades. The
Assad regime shows no sign of ending the slaughter anytime
soon, increasingly deploying artillery, combat aircraft and most
recently surface-to-surface missiles against the opposition. Reports
quoting high-ranking U.S. government officials say the
Assad regime has already loaded chemical weapons into
bombs near or on regime airfields for possible deployment.

Signs are growing of a sectarian proxy war as well, with
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah backing
their fellow Shia at the Assad regime’s core and Qatar, Saudi
Arabia and Turkey backing their Sunni brethren in the opposition.
Al Qaeda affiliates, as well as jihadists, are now among
the opposition’s best-armed factions.

The Obama administration has refrained from directly intervening
or supporting Syria’s increasingly armed opposition,
based on an argument that neither would make the situation
better. But allowing the conflict to continue and simply offering
humanitarian and project assistance treats merely the
symptoms while failing to shape a political settlement that
would help cure the disease: a brutal Assad regime that was
unable to reform trying to shoot one of the youngest populations
in the Middle East into submission.

The Obama administration spent its first two years encouraging
a treaty between the Assad regime and Israel that
would take Damascus out of Iran’s orbit and isolate its ally
Hezbollah. While the method proved wrong, the strategic
goals of containing Iranian influence in the region and keeping
it from obtaining a nuclear weapon remain as valid as
ever. Helping the Syrian opposition push Assad and his
regime aside more quickly would help the United States and
its allies achieve those objectives.

A Syria Strategy for Obama

By Andrew Tabler

Jan 17 2013, 7:26 AM ET

Three bold steps to hasten the end of Assad's regime.

Residents look at buildings damaged by the forces of President al-Assad in Daraya on January 16, 2013. (Reuters)

This post is part of "Obama and the Middle East: Act Two," a series produced with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on U.S. foreign policy in the president's second term. See our full coverage here.
The Assad regime's brutal suppression of the Syrian uprising has spurred a humanitarian disaster, with the United Nations now estimating over 60,000 killed and 3 million displaced. Syrians are now dying of starvation and exposure as food and medical supplies run desperately short. The regime continues to escalate its attacks with the use of artillery, combat aircraft, and, most recently, SCUD and reportedly Fatah 110 missiles against the armed and civilian opposition. The Obama administration has repeatedly voiced its concern that the Assad regime is considering using its chemical weapons stockpile, which includes sarin nerve gas and mustard gas, against its domestic opponents. The U.S. government reportedly even investigated the possible use of a chemical agent last month in Homs. At the same time, Washington has refused to fulfill the opposition's request for more and better weapons that would help it end the regime's onslaught, sowing anti-American sentiment that is being increasingly harvested by Islamic extremists and al-Qaeda affiliates. There is now a real danger that Assad regime's chemical weapons could fall into the hands of militants sworn to destroy the United States and its regional allies.

With U.S. elections now settled, the Obama administration is less constrained by domestic U.S. politics and should now take bold steps to hasten the end of Assad's regime. The fight to take down the regime and its supporters may continue for some time, and divisions between opposition groups means the struggle for what replaces it may be conflict-ridden as well. Even as the war continues, Washington should take steps to ease human suffering and place itself in a better position to secure chemical weapons from use in Syria and elsewhere.
First, Washington should use patriot missile batteries in an offensive capacity against regime aircraft - and deploy them defensively against SCUD and Fatah 110 missiles targeting opposition-dominated areas along Syria's borders with Turkey and Jordan. A package of the patriot missiles recently deployed to southern Turkey augmented with an anti-aircraft capability, for example, could be used to carve out a 50-mile air exclusion zone from the Turkish border city of Kilis to Aleppo, Syria's largest city. This would help the opposition create vital "safe areas" where civilians could be secure in an organized fashion free from regime airstrikes as the war against Assad continues.
As an important ancillary benefit, such safe areas would provide a vital place for the exile-dominated National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC) to politically organize and provide assistance directly to Syrian civilians. If properly defended, diplomats, officials, and aid representatives from the international community could work side by side with Syrians to help alleviate suffering and build a viable government for post-Assad Syria. When fully "liberated" areas under opposition control expand beyond the border regions to Syria's interior, the United States and its allies could follow up with targeted air and missile strikes against Assad regime forces armed with chemical weapons or poised to carry out further mass atrocities.
Second, Washington should provide a package of intelligence-sharing, military training, and other security assistance to mainstream nationalist, non-extremist groups that have been vetted by Western countries, both to increase their military capabilities and in exchange for any chemical weapons captured from the regime's stockpiles. The package should be comprehensive enough to allow participant groups to more rapidly defeat the Assad regime's forces and more effectively secure chemical weapons. Groups receiving assistance would be required to allow U.S. and allied special forces to collect and secure captured stockpiles of chemical weapons.
Third, Washington and its allies should provide local communities supporting mainstream groups that cooperate with Washington's program to secure chemical weapons with a larger civil assistance program. Large swaths of Syrian urban and rural areas have been ravaged by war, and the task of providing services and rebuilding basic infrastructure will be extensive. Such a civil assistance program, if part of an overall strategy, would create a positive incentive for civilian communities to pressure armed groups operating in their areas to comply with the program in the short and medium term. This same system of incentives could also be leveraged to disincentivize ethnic cleansing.
Such an integrated plan would help alleviate the suffering of Syrians, reverse Washington's rapidly declining support among the opposition, and provide real inducements to armed groups that will soon take over large swaths -- if not the entirety -- of Syrian territory to hand over any captured chemical weapons to the United States and its allies. Washington's efforts could be combined with those of Russia, Assad's chief international patron, as well as China, to pressure the Assad regime or any Alawite-dominated rump regime to secure what remains of the regime's stockpile. This approach would not only help keep chemical weapons from being used in the struggle for Syria, but against its neighbors and the West. It would also create incentives for armed and civilian groups in Syria to cooperate and assume the responsibility that goes along with governing a post-Assad Syria.
This article available online at:
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/01/a-syria-strategy-for-obama/267273/

Copyright © 2013 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved.

PolicyWatch 2015

Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Fallout from the Fall of Taftanaz

Andrew J. Tabler, Jeffrey White, and Aaron Y. Zelin

January 14, 2013

The latest rebel success, while significant in battlefield terms, has empowered extremist forces and further highlighted Washington's insufficient support for Syria's mainstream opposition.

On January 11, in yet another sign that the Assad regime is increasingly giving way, an assortment of Islamist/jihadist fighters captured the Taftanaz airbase in Syria. While good news for achieving Washington's seventeen-month-old (and counting) goal of forcing Bashar al-Assad to "step aside," the capture of the base and its weapons stockpile by groups opposed to U.S. interests comes at the expense of the mainline opposition Supreme Military Council (SMC), an armed affiliate of the U.S.-supported National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (SOC). To accelerate Assad's departure and dilute the political and military impact of the Islamists, Washington and its allies will need to boost support for the SMC and other mainline nationalist groups while removing obstructions to urgent humanitarian aid amid an unusually harsh winter.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

Taftanaz was an important victory for the opposition and a clear defeat for the regime. The rebels succeeded because they were able to concentrate adequate forces, coordinate their actions, bring heavy weapons to bear, and sustain the siege for months under regime air attack. This indicates an improvement in their performance, at least for the units involved. It also repeats rebel successes in taking defended regime positions elsewhere in the country, including Aleppo province, Deir al-Zour, and the Damascus countryside.
The victory brought some important direct gains for the rebels:

• They destroyed or captured fifteen to twenty helicopters at the airfield. Most of these were Mi-8/17 utility helicopters, some of which had been equipped with rocket pods for an attack role. This represents approximately 20 percent of the regime's prewar active inventory of a much-relied-upon type of aircraft.
• They captured additional heavy weapons and large quantities of ammunition. Coupled with the freeing up of rebel forces, the equipment gains should boost the opposition's ability to assault other regime positions in the north and perhaps bring them under their control sooner. The battle will also be a huge boost for rebel morale, showing they can take even a major defended position.
• The regime was unable to prevent loss of the base, one of several such failures in the past few months. Damascus did not appear to make any serious attempt to reinforce the airfield or relieve the siege. The number of troops involved in the defense seemed relatively small, and they largely relied on heavy weapons and air power -- a regime pattern. In addition, at least some of the defenders were irregular soldiers from the pro-Assad "popular committees," not regular combat troops; some reports even indicate that officers were evacuated by air before the base fell.

WHO FOUGHT AND WHAT IT MEANS

Three rebel factions took part in the fight: Jabhat al-Nusra (JN), the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), and the Syrian Liberation Front (SLF). All three are outside the structure of the SMC, a grouping of provincial military council leaders and battalion (katiba) and brigade (liwa) commanders formed in December. The council's purpose is to unite Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions, implement command and control, funnel SOC support to armed units, and keep weapons out of the hands of extremists.
Jabhat al-Nusra, an independent faction that is not part of the FSA, is a global jihadist group that follows al-Qaeda's worldview. According to the State Department's December announcement designating it as a terrorist organization, JN was established as a branch of al-Qaeda in Iraq nearly a year ago. Over the past few months, it has gained prominence as one of the country's best fighting forces, conducting more than 600 suicide bombings, assassinations, improvised explosive device attacks, and strikes on regime checkpoints and security/military buildings, in addition to regular battlefield action. Although JN is capable of attacking most parts of Syria, the majority of its operations have occurred in Aleppo and Idlib, and to a lesser extent Damascus and Deir al-Zour. The group's ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state in the entire Levant as a starting point to reestablishing the Caliphate.
The Syrian Islamic Front is a conglomeration of eleven "brigades" outside the FSA. Formed last December, it lacks JN's coherent structure. Ideologically, the SIF can best be described as a collection of locally focused jihadists with no known connections to al-Qaeda. Three of the brigades took part in the Taftanaz battle: Kataib Ahrar al-Sham (the SIF's leading unit), Jamaat al-Taliah al-Islamiyah, and Harakat al-Fajr al-Islamiyah. Like JN, the SIF's goal is to establish an Islamic state based on Salafi interpretations of Islam, but only within Syria proper. The video announcing the group's creation indicates that its funding comes from the Qatar Charity Organization and Turkey's Humanitarian Relief Fund (IHH), which supports U.S.-designated terrorist groups such as Hamas.
The Syrian Liberation Front is another grouping of so-called brigades outside the FSA, founded last September. The smallest faction involved in the Taftanaz operation was Liwa Dawoud, one of the eight battalions within Suqur al-Sham, a leading SLF brigade. Ideologically similar to the SIF, the SLF hopes to establish an Islamic state in Syria; its members are a mix of Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamists and Salafists who are less radical than those in the SIF and JN. The SLF is believed to receive funding from the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and wealthy Persian Gulf donors.
Given their demonstrated fighting prowess, these Islamist forces have earned much respect from Syrians. Unlike some FSA groups, which have increasingly been accused of corruption in places such as Aleppo, JN, the SIF, and the SLF are viewed as fair brokers that do not take advantage of the downtrodden. Unless something changes, Islamists are likely to play a significant role in northern Syria following the regime's departure.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WAR

For the rebels, the airbase capture indicates that major regime positions in the provinces are vulnerable. But it also suggests that better-defended areas -- such as Damascus and environs, where regime forces are relatively dense and well supported -- will remain a serious challenge.
In addition, the battle raises questions about the regime's strategy of maintaining some military presence, in every province. Although this approach allows Assad to maintain the image that he has not lost any province, it is costing the regime a good deal of personnel and equipment while providing the rebels with better arms and ammunition. Currently, several other northern airfields are under attack; if the rebels can overcome their organizational limitations and capture those bases as well, it would be a still greater, even strategic, defeat for the regime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In war, no single success or failure should be given too much emphasis, especially in its immediate aftermath. Furthermore, gains in one part of Syria do not necessarily indicate progress elsewhere in this far-flung and complex conflict. Nevertheless, the capture of Taftanaz is yet another sign that the regime is losing control throughout much of the country.
At the same time, victories by Islamist/jihadist groups would seem to come at the expense of the mainline nationalist armed groups represented by the SMC, a coalition that Washington has regular contact with despite withholding direct support. The Islamists are now battled tested, better armed, and receiving support from Syrians who are fighting the regime while suffering the worst winter in twenty years.
To temper Islamist gains and better influence Syria's political and military future post-Assad, Washington should encourage its allies to arm SMC units in order to boost their fighting capacity. It should also provide vital intelligence and logistical support to help SMC forces displace the regime more quickly and establish areas where civilian SOC members can work with local and revolutionary councils on providing vital humanitarian assistance and local governance. Finally, Washington should cut the legal and bureaucratic red tape impeding the provision of U.S. assistance outside official channels, since a majority of aid is currently distributed via the regime-dominated Syrian Arab Red Crescent to areas under regime control.
Andrew J. Tabler is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute and author of In the Lion's Den: An Eyewitness Account of Washington's Battle with Syria. Jeffrey White is a defense fellow at the Institute and a former senior defense intelligence officer. Aaron Y. Zelin is the Institute's Richard Borow fellow.

WSJ Live: How Will U.S. Respond To Syria-Iran Alliance?

1/10/2013 10:03:42 AM5:08

Syria agreed to release more than 2,000 prisoners in exchange for 48 Iranians held by Syrian rebels, in a deal that highlighted Iran's sustained influence over the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. Farnaz Fassihi and Andrew Tabler report.

http://live.wsj.com/video/syria-rebels-free-iranians-in-prisoner-swap/081FD0C5-CEAD-4671-8D06-CBE1A0870F5E.html#!081FD0C5-CEAD-4671-8D06-CBE1A0870F5E

President Bashar Assad: His Inner Circle And His Options

January 08, 2013 1:00 PM

The United Nations released statistics estimating that more than 60,000 people have been killed in Syria since the conflict began in March 2011. In his first public appearance in six months, President Bashar Assad addressed a crowd of supporters in Damascus Sunday to outline new structural reforms within the government.

Guests

Amb. Frederic Hof, senior fellow, Atlantic Council
Deborah Amos, foreign correspondent, NPR
Andrew Tabler, senior fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy

http://www.npr.org/player/v2/mediaPlayer.html?action=1&t=1&islist=false&id=168883337&m=168883328